The Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry After TRIPS — A Practitioner\u27s View by Al-Ali, Nermien
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 26, Issue 2 2002 Article 4
The Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry After
TRIPS — A Practitioner’s View
Nermien Al-Ali∗
∗
Copyright c©2002 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry After
TRIPS — A Practitioner’s View
Nermien Al-Ali
Abstract
The pharmaceutical industry in Egypt is the largest in the Middle East and North Africa
(“MENA”) region, and one that has attracted foreign investment despite the fact that Egyptian
law has not always provided pharmaceuticals with patent protection. The situation changed with
the signing of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS
agreement” or “TRIPS”), strengthening the interest of the U.S. and other pharmaceutical compa-
nies in increasing their investment in Egypt. The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry is currently
undergoing many changes spurred by the implementation of TRIPS and the globalization of trade.
Many of these changes can be seen through examining the new Intellectual Property Code, which
Egypt passed in June 2002 to comply with the provisions of TRIPS. This Article examines the
changes in the law and the economic policies of Egypt that pertain to the pharmaceutical industry
in light of TRIPS, viewed in the context of the global debates that have revolved around the effects
of extending patent protection to pharmaceuticals in the developing countries. Part I of this Article
introduces the TRIPS agreement and the conflicting interests of the developed and the developing
countries that overshadowed its drafting. Part II outlines TRIPS provisions relating to the protec-
tion of pharmaceuticals and sheds light on how the conflicts mentioned in Part I shaped the final
version of TRIPS that Members signed in late 1994. This Part also examines the anomalies of
TRIPS implementation within the first few years of its coming into effect, leading to the Doha
Declaration in 2001. Part III examines the new Egyptian intellectual property law enacted in June
2002 to comply with TRIPS, with particular emphasis on the protection of pharmaceuticals. Part
IV takes a closer look at the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry, its size and prospects for growth,
as well as the challenges it has to address. The main challenge to the Egyptian government is how
to strike a balance between facilitating an open-market policy to promote investment by foreign
research-based pharmaceutical companies, while at the same time ensuring adequate public access
to essential medicines and promoting the development of the economic and healthcare infrastruc-
tures.
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The pharmaceutical industry in Egypt is the largest in the
Middle East and North Africa ("MENA") region, and one that
has attracted foreign investment despite the fact that Egyptian
law has not always provided pharmaceuticals with patent protec-
tion. The situation changed with the signing of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS agreement" or "TRIPS"),' strengthening the interest of
the U.S. and other pharmaceutical companies in increasing
their investment in Egypt. The Egyptian pharmaceutical indus-
try is currently undergoing many changes spurred by the imple-
mentation of TRIPS and the globalization of trade. Many of
these changes can be seen through examining the new Intellec-
tual Property Code,2 which Egypt passed in June 2002 to comply
with the provisions of TRIPS. This Article examines the changes
in the law and the economic policies of Egypt that pertain to the
pharmaceutical industry in light of TRIPS, viewed in the context
of the global debates that have revolved around the effects of
extending patent protection to pharmaceuticals in the develop-
ing countries.
Part I of this Article introduces the TRIPS agreement and
the conflicting interests of the developed and the developing
countries that overshadowed its drafting. Part II outlines TRIPS
provisions relating to the protection of pharmaceuticals and
sheds light on how the conflicts mentioned in Part I shaped the
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tellectual Capital Management. Of Counsel to Ibrachy & Dermarkar Law Firm in Cairo,
Egypt. Author of the forthcoming book COMPREHENSIVE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL MAN-
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1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
2. Intellectual Property Law No. 82 of 2002 (Egypt) [hereinafter Law No. 82]. The
version of the Law No. 82 used in this Article is based on the author's translation. Full
text of the Law No. 82 is also available at http://www.agip.com/laws/egypt/p.htm.
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final version of TRIPS that Members signed in late 1994. This
Part also examines the anomalies of TRIPS implementation
within the first few years of its coming into effect, leading to the
Doha Declaration in 2001. Part III examines the new Egyptian
intellectual property law enacted in June 2002 to comply with
TRIPS, with particular emphasis on the protection of
pharmaceuticals. Part IV takes a closer look at the Egyptian
pharmaceutical industry, its size and prospects for growth, as
well as the challenges it has to address. The main challenge to
the Egyptian government is how to strike a balance between fa-
cilitating an open-market policy to promote investment by for-
eign research-based pharmaceutical companies, while at the
same time ensuring adequate public access to essential
medicines and promoting the development of the economic and
healthcare infrastructures.
TRIPS AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS -
HEATED NEGOTIATIONS
The time was late 1994; the place was Marrakesh. The ex-
otic capital of Morocco was then housing one of the most impor-
tant and intense negotiations in the history of the "new world
order" - the TRIPS agreement. Lobbyists representing copy-
right owners (the motion picture, music and software industries,
content and database providers), patent holders (mainly the
pharmaceutical industry), and owners of famous trademarks
were pushing for reforms in intellectual property laws of devel-
oping countries. One of the hottest debates involved the provi-
sion in TRIPS for patent protection of pharmaceuticals, which
were not protected under the intellectual property systems of
most developing countries. In these countries, pharmaceutical
compositions were part of the public domain, and although orig-
inators did not necessarily publish particular compositions, they
were available through patent records of other countries or dis-
coverable through reverse engineering.
Countries that denied patent protection to pharmaceuticals
were still interested in promoting innovation, and most had in
place relatively strong patent systems. The exclusion of
pharmaceuticals from patent protection, however, was to satisfy
the overriding public interest in keeping pharmaceuticals afford-
able to the poor masses. As such, the debate was characterized
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as that of the developed countries and their powerful pharma-
ceutical industries, against the developing countries with their
local pharmaceutical industries that provided for the poor
masses through copying unprotectable' product compositions.
The debate, therefore, was not only vibrant, but intense, with
polarized views and positions.
In some developing countries this debate boiled down to a
particular government's responsibility to protect the local phar-
maceutical industry, which was heavily dependant on copying
unprotectable product compositions and which had successfully
provided affordable pharmaceuticals for the poor masses. On
the one hand, the developed countries were trying to protect the
economic interests of one of their most powerful industries -
the pharmaceutical industry - while on the other hand, the de-
veloping countries were concerned about the demise of their lo-
cal pharmaceutical industries, which lacked the infrastructures
that would enable them to effectively compete with multina-
tional corporations. While the developed countries were seen as
self-interested, caring little about the poverty and the suffering
of the poor masses in the developing countries, the developing
countries were seen as over-protective of their domestic pharma-
ceutical industries that were free-riding on the successes of phar-
maceutical companies in the developed countries.4 The debate
and the polarization of positions involved a number of issues
that can be summarized in the following table:
3. 1 resist the tendency to refer to the copying activity of pharmaceutical compa-
nies in the developing countries prior to TRIPS as "pirating," as it has been referred to
in some Articles. This is because respecting the sovereignty of every country in setting
its laws entails looking at the activity from the perspective of the domestic law and pol-
icy. Under the domestic laws of most developing countries that provided no patent
protection for pharmaceuticals prior to TRIPS, it was perfectly legal to copy the compo-
sition (not the process of production) of pharmaceuticals. As such, it cannot be de-
scribed as "pirating" except when judged through the perspective of a foreign system of
law, where pharmaceuticals are protectable by patent law. This distinction is of utter
importance as it highlights the difference in perspective between those systems that
provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals and those that do not. To generalize
and to use the term "pirating" to include activities that are legal under the domestic
laws both, confuses the issues and creates ill will between the local and foreign interests.
4. For more information as to the interest groups that had major impact on TRIPS
negotiations, in particular the U.S. pharmaceutical research-based companies, groups
from the developing countries (including India and Egypt), and other global NGOs
opposing strong protection of pharmaceuticals see George Foster, Opposing Forces in a
Revolution in International Patent Protection: the U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its
Aftermath, 3 UCLAJ. INT'L. L.& FOREIGN AFF. 283 (1998).
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Type of Research Developed Countries' Views Developing (& the Least Devel-
and Develop- oped) Countries' Views
ment ("R&D")
R&D in general Patent protection will promote Patent protection cannot pro-
R&D in general and encourage mote R&D by local companies
local companies to file or pat- when they lack technical capabil-
ents around the globe.' ities and the requisite economic
infrastructures.
R&D in local dis- Patent protection will promote Patent protection will not pro-
eases R&D expenditures by multina- mote R&D in local diseases, giv-
tionals to find cures for local dis- en that the expected returns are
eases. much less than those required
by mtJtinationals to invest in
R&D.
Affordable Patent protection will not raise Patent protection will increase
pharmaceuticals the prices of pharmaceuticals in the price of pharmaceuticals, ac-
the long run. Other factors af- centuating the problem of access
fect access to pharmaceuticals. of the poor masses to essential
pharmaceuticals.
Safety, quality Patent protection will promote Patent protection has no effect
and effectiveness safety and quality of medicines on quality or safety as all are
as the developing countries have subject to regulatory procedures.
been dumping grounds for Adulterated pharmaceuticals are
adulterated generic pharmaceuti- more a result of corruption.
cals.
Protection of do- Patent protection will promote Patent protection will destroy
mestic industry the development of local phar- the local industry which is de-
maceutical companies as t~ey pendant on copying composi-
can file their own patents. tions and lacks resources andgn-
frastructure to establish R&D.
5. India is cited as an example where R&D by local companies increased six-fold
from 50 Rs. Crores (I Rs. Crores = 1 million Rs.) in the late 1980s to 320 Rs. Crores by
2000. See Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India ("OPPI"), Pharmaceutical
Industry in India, available at http://www.indiaoppi.com/intelprop.htm. Another exam-
ple is Mexico where R&D expenditures tripled following the provision of patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals.
6. It is reported that pharmaceutical companies need to ensure that a new product
will generate between U.S.$350-$550 million to support their high R&D expenditures.
Estimates reach around U.S.$800 million for the production of new breakthroughs over
ten to twelve years of R&D. A blockbuster appears approximately every five years and
only one in fifty has sales that exceed U.S.$2 billion. As a result, a new product, which is
estimated to generate less than U.S.$200 million, is hardly considered for R&D. Most
diseases in the developing countries fall within this range. That being said, the leading
pharmaceutical companies allocate marginal investment for R&D in diseases like mala-
ria and T.B. in order to appear "good citizens". See M.D. Nair, EmergingR&D Scenario in
the Indian pharmaceuticals industry, available at www.pharmabiz.com/newsfeat/feat84.asp.
See also infra Part IV.
7. Brazil, China, South Korea, and others are cited as examples of countries where
patent applications filed by local companies for protection inside and outside their
countries increased with pharmaceutical patent protection. In South Korea, it is re-
ported that 75% of pharmaceutical patent applications are filed by the local industry. It
is also reported that pharmaceutical patents applications filed by Indian local compa-
nies reached 2,500 applications, in addition to 600 applications filed abroad.
8. Most of these companies have no infrastructures to support high R&D expendi-
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Compulsory li- Will adversely affect R&D ex- Will be necessary to address in-
censing penditures. TRIPS provisions in terest of public health, and to
that regard should be read nar- deal with emergencies. TRIPS
rowly and be invoked only in1 0  provisions in that regard should
cases of extreme emergency. be read broadly, provided that
the conditions for their use
(stipulated in TRIPS) are satis-
fied.
It is important to understand the conflicting interests that
overshadowed the drafting of TRIPS and how they shaped the
final provisions of TRIPS, as elaborated further in Part II.
II. PATENT PROTECTION FOR PHARMACEUTICALS UNDER
TRIPS - THE FINAL COMPROMISE
It is true that the debate was resolved, despite fierce resis-
tance by a number of interest groups in the developing coun-
tries, in favor of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The
matter, however, is far from simple. What is not clear to many is
that TRIPS incorporated provisions that allow Members to cre-
ate effective exceptions to patentability in general (under Article
30) " and to impose compulsory licenses over pharmaceutical
patents, subject to certain conditions (Article 31).2 It seems
tures over long periods of time. This issue is actually considered one of the main entry
barriers for smaller pharmaceutical companies in the developed economies, and is one
of the drivers of mega-mergers in the pharmaceutical industries.
9. The example of Canada is always cited in support of this argument since R&D
expenditures increased over 700 times between 1987 and 1998 following the repeal of
compulsory licensing provisions. Canada's economic and health care infrastructures
and problems, however, are not comparable to those of the developing countries,
where the problem of public access to pharmaceuticals is life-threatening (mainly due
to poverty).
10. See Michelle Nerozzi, The Battle Over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: are Developing
Countries Being "TRIPped" by Developed Countries?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 605, at 616 (2002)
(citing developed countries' resistance to use of compulsory licensing even though it is
allowed under Article 31 of TRIPS).
11. See TRIPS, art. 30. Article 30 provides:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legit-
imate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests
of third parties.
Id.
12. Id. art. 31. Article 31 provides:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the gov-
ernment or third parties authorized by the government, the following provi-
sions shall be respected:
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(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user
has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been success-
ful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of ex-
treme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of na-
tional emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder
shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case
of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without
making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a
valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall
be informed promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for
which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall
only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined
after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive;
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or
goodwill which enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the do-
mestic market of the Member authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of
the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and
when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.
The competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated
request, the continued existence of these circumstances;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circum-
stances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authoriza-
tion;
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct
higher authority in that Member;
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct
higher authority in that Member;
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subpara-
graphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice deter-
mined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. The
need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in deter-
mining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities
shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization if and when the
conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur;
(1) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the
second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent
("the first patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply:
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important
technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the
invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on
reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and
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that Articles 30 and 31 were added as a last compromise to in-
duce the developing countries to agree to extend patent protec-
tion to pharmaceuticals. In general, Articles 30 and 31 entitle
Members to limit or revoke certain pharmaceutical patents to
respond to public health necessities or emergencies. However,
the practice of the developed countries, particularly the United
States, intimidated many developing countries a few years after
TRIPS came into effect. These countries feared using Articles 30
and 31 and thereby adversely affecting their trade positions. As
a result, it was necessary for the Members to meet again in Doha,
Qatar in November 2001, to affirm the right of the developing
countries to invoke Articles 30 and 31 in addition to other decla-
rations. 3 Below is an examination of the various TRIPS provi-
sions and the issues that arose regarding their application.
A. Patent and Other Protection for Pharmaceuticals
TRIPS does not expressly extend patent protection to
pharmaceuticals, but rather, specifies what could be excluded
from patentability. Pharmaceuticals are not on this list of ex-
cluded items.
Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of in-
dustrial application [... 1.
(2) Members shall exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial ex-
ploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environ-
ment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
(3) Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans and animals;
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assigna-
ble except with the assignment of the second patent.
Id.
13. For full text of the Doha Declaration see World Trade Organization, Ministerial
declaration [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/minist e/min0l_e/mindecl e.htn.
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(b) plants and animals other that microorganisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of
plants or animals other than non-biological and mi-
crobiological processes. However, Members shall
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system [...]. "
In effect, Article 27 provides for extended patent protection for
all types of inventions regardless of technology, except for the
areas specifically excluded under paragraph 2.
In addition, TRIPS provides further protection for
pharmaceuticals. Research-based pharmaceutical companies
have faced another problem in registering their pharmaceuticals
in the developing countries. Either for lack of protection or
vague registration procedures, generic producers have unfairly
benefited from the test data which was presented by the pharma-
ceutical companies to prove the safety and efficacy of their ge-
neric versions. Pharmaceutical companies lobbied, therefore,
for clear provisions that ensured that this type of proprietarily
valuable information would only be used for the purposes for
which it was submitted and that it would be protected from any
unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, TRIPS provides for the
protection of undisclosed information or trade secrets in a gen-
eral manner under Article 39.15 In addition, Article 39(3) ad-
dresses the situation relating to the registration process of
pharmaceuticals as follows:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the
14. TRIPS, art. 27.
15. See id. art. 39(1)-(2). Article 39(1)-(2) provides:
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as
provided in Article lObis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall pro-
tect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submit-
ted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3.
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing informa-
tion lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used
by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configura-
tion and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily
accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of
information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
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marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical
products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission
of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which in-
volves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against
unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to pro-
tect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the
data are protected against unfair commercial use.'"
Under the general principles of trade secret law, which are
reiterated under Article 39, undisclosed information is protected
as long as it remains secret, secrecy has commercial value, and
reasonable security measures are undertaken to protect this se-
crecy. For the originator, the dilemma of test data being
presented to public agencies to obtain marketing approvals for
pharmaceuticals, is that such data may be used by competitors,
mainly generic producers, who may want to rely on it to prove
the bio-equivalency of their generic products. Of course, in the
developing countries many local producers have tried to rely on
this information when possible to avoid performing their own
clinical tests. Although Article 39(3) addresses this very prob-
lem, it does not provide a solution.
The main issue, however, that persisted to the final TRIPS
negotiations, was how to enable developing countries with their
weak economic and healthcare infrastructures to provide afford-
able pharmaceuticals to the poor masses after price increases re-
sulting from the implementation of TRIPS. In addition to the
high levels of poverty and the weak infrastructures, developing
countries needed to reform their legal systems to provide ade-
quate patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Since the develop-
ing countries had denied patent protection to pharmaceuticals
for so long, their legal systems lacked the requisite financial re-
sources and knowledge to handle patent applications relating to
pharmaceuticals. The patent offices of the developing countries
had not maintained records of similar patents in other coun-
tries, or if they had, they had failed to train patent examiners
regarding the use and the examination of these patents. These
counties currently face a strong need for additional expert pat-
ent examiners; training; an update of databases; and a strength-
ening of the judicial and enforcement systems.
16. Id. art. 39 (3).
2003] THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 283
The situation in Egypt exemplifies these concerns. In a sub-
mission to the United Nations ("U.N.") by M. E1-Magdoub, it was
estimated that Egypt would need U.S.$98,000 to increase patent
personnel and add equipment; U.S.$192,000 to strengthen the
judicial framework; and U.S.$1,000,000 to train and develop cus-
tom authorities. These estimates do not include the costs
needed to seek and obtain technical assistance for the develop-
ment of human resources. 17
Weaknesses in the economic and healthcare infrastructures
of the developing countries are very serious and deep-rooted.
On the one hand, the local pharmaceutical industries' infra-
structures have not developed the research capabilities that
would enable them to effectively compete with foreign pharma-
ceutical companies. On the other hand, there are no health
care infrastructures (effective public medical insurance or af-
fordable private medical insurance) that ensure that the masses
will have adequate access to necessary medicines. In many devel-
oping countries, the pharmaceutical industries' research capabil-
ities have been limited for a long time to the reformulation of
product compositions, rather than to the creation of new ones.
The local companies have mainly depended on copying the
composition of products that may be patented in other coun-
tries, and which are in the public domain within their domestic
territories. These industries' research capabilities, therefore,
have been limited to reformulating compositions, from perusing
the claims of foreign patents, to reverse engineering of foreign
products. In these countries, R&D expenditures in the pharma-
ceutical sector have been negligible when compared to the
amounts spent in the developed countries. Given the high ex-
penditures related to R&D, which the local pharmaceutical in-
dustries in the developing countries have not supported, let
alone incorporated in their infrastructures, the domestic phar-
maceutical industries in the developing countries are currently
threatened with extinction or dwindling market shares. Thus,
the protection of pharmaceuticals has put the local pharmaceu-
tical industries in a weak competitive position, and has forced
them to enter into agreements with the more experienced and
17. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT ("UNCTAD"),
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 23-24 (1996).
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powerful foreign pharmaceutical companies, where their bar-
gaining position is relatively feeble.
The weak economic and healthcare infrastructures pose a
major risk, since there are no infrastructures to absorb or dis-
tribute through effective medical insurance the higher costs of
"patented pharmaceuticals." As a result, these higher costs of
access to necessary medicines are passed to the masses, a signifi-
cant proportion of whom fall under the poverty line. Many de-
veloping countries, therefore, have argued that patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals, when they lack the requisite infrastruc-
tures (legal, industrial, and health care), may seriously affect
their ability to adequately provide affordable pharmaceuticals to
their poor masses. The developed countries, as a result, have
had to compromise, and despite the immense pressure and lob-
bying by their pharmaceutical industries, have attended to the
evident hazards that the developing countries may face in intro-
ducing pharmaceutical patent protection. That compromise was
incorporated in TRIPS in two major ways: the transitional and
the "exceptions to rights" provisions.
1. Transitional Provisions - Developing Countries Given Time
to Get It Right
The developing and the least developed countries were al-
lowed five and ten years, respectively, before they were required
to comply with any of the TRIPS provisions. This took the Janu-
ary 1995 deadline to January 2000, according to Article 65(4) of
TRIPS. 8 The least developed countries are those identified as
such by the U.N. classification," ' while the developing countries'
status is determined by the World Trade Organization
18. See TRIPS, art. 65(4). Article 65(4) provides:
To the extent that a developing country Member is obliged by this Agreement
to extend product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable
in its territory on the general date of application of this Agreement for that
Member, as defined in paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provi-
sions on product patents of Section 5 of Part 11 to such areas of technology for
an additional period of five years.
Id.
19. See UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), available at http://www.unc
tad.org; see also Least Developed Countries, at http://www.uncdf.org/projects/html/ldc.
htm.
2003] THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 285
("WTO") .20
In addition, the developing countries may opt to extend this
grace period in relation to providing protection for
pharmaceuticals for another five years until January 2005. This
additional grace period, however, has many strings attached to
it. The countries invoking the additional grace period have to
provide interim protection measures for pharmaceuticals.
These are stipulated under Article 70(8) as follows:
Where a Member does not make available as of the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products commen-
surate with its obligations under Article 27, that Member
shall:
(a) notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI, provide as
from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement
a means by which applications for patents for such inven-
tions can be filed;
(b) apply to these applications, as of the date of the applica-
tion of this Agreement, the criteria for patentability as
laid down in this Agreement as if those criteria were be-
ing applied on the date of filing in that Member or,
where priority is available and claimed, the priority date
of the application; and
(c) provide patent protection in accordance with this Agree-
ment as from the grant of the patent and for the remain-
der of the patent term, counted from the filing date in
accordance with Article 33 of this Agreement [20 years
term], 2 ' for those of these applications that meet the cri-
teria for protection referred to in subparagraph (b).22
Applications filed in the mailbox are not required to be ex-
amined by the patent office of the Member, but must merely be
accepted and kept until the five-year grace period expires. Prior-
ity is guaranteed from the date of the application. The main
problem with this system is that backlogs in the patent systems of
the developing countries, where such applications have not been
customarily accepted, is going to escalate, extending the subse-
quent period of examination. This problem is not addressed by
20. See World Trade Organization, Who are the developing countries in the W'O?,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dlwhoe.htm.
21. Emphasis added.
22. TRIPS, art. 70(8).
286 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:274
Article 70(9), which provides for Exclusive Marketing Rights
("EMRs") until the Patent office decides on the application, or
for five years, whichever is shorter, as follows:
Where a product is subject to a patent application in a Mem-
ber in accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing
rights shall be granted [. . .] for a period of five years after
obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a
product patent is granted or rejected in that Member, which-
ever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry
into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has
been filed and a patent has been granted for that product in
another Member and marketing approval obtained in such
other Member. 23
Thus, the five years stipulated by Article 70(9) would provide the
applicant with EMRs, provided that the specified conditions are
met. The most important condition is that a patent application
relating to the pharmaceutical in question must be filed prior to
January 1995. This condition already resulted in the exclusion
of Viagra from the protection of Article 70 where Eli Lilly and
other multinational pharmaceutical companies in Egypt are pre-
paring to produce it.
The EMRs, however, extend only to the shorter of the two
periods: either for five years from the date of the marketing ap-
proval, or until the application is decided. It is noted that with
backlogs in the patent office, there may be a "protection void"
where EMRs expire long before a decision on patentability is
reached. Still, the mere fact that there is a patent application
awaiting a decision will probably deter competition from pursu-
ing an R&D in the areas covered by the application. This deter-
rent effect, however, may not be sufficient. Despite this, Articles
70(8) and (9) still provide ample protection compared to the
situation prior to TRIPS and until Members provide for their
own patent protection.
2. Exceptions to Rights and Compulsory Licensing - the
Provisions Loathed by Developed Countries
Articles 30 and 31 contain the main exceptions to intellec-
tual property rights protected by TRIPS. Article 30 expressly
provides that Members may provide for limited exceptions to the
23. Id. art. 70(9).
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exclusive rights conferred by a patent provided that "such excep-
tions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate in-
terests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate in-
terests of third parties. 2 4
Article 31, also known as the compulsory licensing provi-
sion, does not expressly provide for compulsory licensing but
stipulates that where the law of a Member allows for use "other
than that allowed under Article 30" of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, certain con-
ditions should be satisfied. 25 According to Article 31, compul-
sory licensing can be imposed on a patent, provided that the
person applying for the license failed to obtain a license from
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms over a reasona-
ble period of time. This condition, however, does not apply in
cases where the compulsory license is needed to respond to a
"national emergency" or "other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency"; where the invention is used for "public non-commercial
use"; or to remedy anti-competitive practices committed by the
right holder. 26 That being said, the right holder should still be
informed promptly of the decision relating to the compulsory
license. In all cases the right holder should be adequately remu-
nerated, taking into consideration the commercial value of the
invention. Every case should be decided on its own merits and
both, the decision to issue the compulsory license, and that de-
termining the value of the remuneration, should be subject to
judicial review.
The compulsory license should also incorporate the follow-
ing terms:
" Be limited in scope and duration to its purpose and be ter-
minated when the situations leading to its existence "cease
to exist or are unlikely to recur";
" Be limited to the supply of the domestic market only;
" Be non-exclusive and non-assignable, except as part of the
enterprise; and
* In cases where the license is imposed to enable the ex-
ploitation of another patent that cannot be exploited with-
out infringing on the licensed patent and the other patent
24. TRIPS, art. 30.
25. Id. art. 31.
26. Id.
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involves an important technical advance of considerable ec-
onomic significance, the owner of the licensed patent
should be entitled to a cross-license over the other patent,
and the license cannot be assigned without the assignment
of the other patent.27
Both Articles 30 and 31 should be read in conjunction with
Article 8, which states the purpose of the TRIPS agreement. Ar-
ticle 8(1) asserts that Members may adopt "necessary measures
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the pub-
lic interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic
and technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. '28 Article
8(2) extends such measures to laws that are designed to prevent
abuse of intellectual property rights by the right holders and
practices that may hamper international technology transfer.29
The ambiguity and confusion that surround the interpreta-
tion of Articles 30 and 31 and the tendency of the developed
countries to limit their application to situations of extreme
emergency, have been drastically highlighted by the AIDS/HIV
case of South Africa."' The South African Ministry of Health im-
posed a compulsory license over a number of AIDS medications.
As a result, thirty American pharmaceutical companies lobbied
the U.S. government to sue the South African government for
violation of TRIPS. South Africa was also removed from the
"most favored member trade status" under the U.S. Special
301." 1 The U.S. policy and actions were strongly criticized by
humanitarian organizations including Doctors Without Borders,
the World Bank, and the World Health Organization
("WHO"); 32 and the reputation of the U.S. pharmaceutical com-
27. Id.
28. Id. art. 8(1).
29. See id. art. 8(2).
30. See e.g., Andrea M. Curti, The WJfO Dispute Settlement Understanding: an Unlikely
Weapon in the Fight Against AIDS, 27 AMJ.L. AND MED. 469 (2001).
31. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, Sec. 301, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
Sec. 2411 (1979) [hereinafter Special 301]. Special 301 is the principal statutory au-
thority under which the United States may impose trade sanctions against foreign coun-
tries that maintain unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory acts, policies, or prac-
tices; violate or deny rights; and restrict U.S. commerce. See also Exec. Ord. No. 13155,
Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies, 65 F.R. 30521 (May 10,
2000).
32. See e.g., Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War: U.S. Policy Keeps
Pices Prohibitive, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at Al.
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panies was battered. As a result, the United States and the lead-
ing pharmaceutical companies backed down, dropped the law-
suit on April 19, 2001, and donated AIDS medications both, free
of charge, and with considerable price reductions to South Af-
rica and other African countries.33
The implications of this case are very serious as they show
that even in cases of extreme emergency (AIDS epidemic in Af-
rica), a developing country, South Africa in this case, may be
fiercely attacked and its trade position with the United States
jeopardized for rightfully invoking one of the provisions of
TRIPS. 4 The South African case is not the only incident. In
fact, the United States has threatened to "curtail economic aid
programs to South Africa and Thailand, among others, for
adopting or preparing to adopt measures to allow them to ad-
dress their healthcare crises, including broadly interpreting
TRIPS to allow compulsory licensing and other forms of loose
patent protection."35
The U.S. tradition of acting unilaterally is one of the ten-
dencies that the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") 36 tried to moderate. The GATT provides that a Mem-
ber should refer a violation by another Member to the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") of the WTO.37 Unlike all predecessor
international treaties, the GATT has more teeth and can result
33. GlaxoSmithKline offered antiretroviral Combivir to AIDS patients at only
U.S.$4 a day; Merck cut its prices considerably; BristolSquibbMyers supplied its AIDS
medication 90% below cost; and Pfizer offered its antifungal medicine to AIDS patients
at no charge, and promised to construct an AIDS training clinic in Africa to strengthen
the medical infrastructure. Despite attempts by the leading multinational pharmaceuti-
cal companies to mend the situation, many humanitarian organizations are still skepti-
cal if these programs are going to last. See Oxfam Policy Papers, South Africa vs. the drug
giants (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/safrica/
safrica2.htm.
34. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 2002 CONFERENCE ACCESS ro MEDICINES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: INTERNA-
TIONAL FACILITATION OR HINDRANCE? PANEL #2: TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES, 20
WIS. INT'L LJ. 481 (Summer 2002). See also Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global
Aceess to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: the South African
Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. Rrv. 137 (2001).
35. See Nerozzi, supra n.10, at 616.
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, GATT Secretariat,
Geneva, July 1986.
37. Marrakesh Agreement Fstablishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1441 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
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in serious trade sanctions. The DSB is governed by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding ("DSU") which provides a mecha-
nism for referring the dispute to Members for consultation, and
investigation and arbitration by a Panel, which can impose a
number of trade sanctions that are same-sector, except if ineffec-
tive, on the violating Member until compliance. 8 Although the
power of the United States to take unilateral action under Spe-
cial 301 is arguably curtailed by the GATT," a number of au-
thors have suggested that the United States may or should in-
voke Special 301 penalties in violation of TRIPS and use its "uni-
lateral arsenal" to coerce countries into providing adequate
protection for intellectual property.") Bello and Holmer, for in-
stance, suggest that "[tihe expectation engendered by the new
system [referring to DSU] - that little countries as well as big
powerful ones might be able to stand up to U.S. 'bullying' under
section 301 - could undermine the credibility of the U.S. threat
of unilateral action, and thus the success of section 301-type pro-
grams."'" Regardless of how the United States intends to use
Special 301 and other measures to take retaliatory action or issue
intimidating threats, it seems that the less powerful Members will
have some recourse.
That being said, "the developing countries would be forced
to accept the terms set forth by the powerful developed coun-
tries or risk harm to their relationship in the international trade
market."42 It is important to note that the threat of retaliation by
the developed countries is destructive, as it deepens the culture
of mistrust and frustration experienced by many developing
countries, and hence may defeat desired collaboration to comply
with TRIPS. Creating good will and a relatively balanced use of
38. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) ("DSU"). The WTO Agreements cov-
ered by the DSU consist of all multilateral agreements listed in the WTO Agreement
Annex 1 and 2, and all plurilateral agreements listed in the INTO Agreement Annex 4.
39. See Special 301. See also Robert Pechman, Note, Seeking Multilateral Protection for
Intellectual Property: the U.S. TRIPS Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179 (Win-
ter, 1998); see also Ronald Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries, 35 INT'L LAW. 1083 (2001).
40. See Pechman, supra n.39, at 206-09; see alsoJudith H. Bello & Albert F. Holmer,
Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L
LAw. 1095, 1096-97 (Winter, 1994).
41. See Bello & Holmer, supra n.40, at 1102.
42. See Nerozzi, supra n.10, at 627.
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power, at least through mutual respect of international agree-
ments, is essential to ensure not only that domestic laws are en-
acted to comply with TRIPS, but also to ensure that they are ef-
fectively enforced. One of the problems often cited regarding
legal systems of the developing countries is ineffective enforce-
ment of the rights of multinational companies caused by the ju-
diciary's concern about accentuating inequities. This is not
caused by an irrational desire to protect the local companies or
industries, but is the result of actual incidents where power is
abused and the judicial consciousness is troubled by prevalent
injustice." These concerns did not go unnoticed, particularly
after the South African case. Members, therefore, had to meet
again in Qatar to address these issues.
B. The Doha Declaration - Developed Countries Promise to Behave!
The grave concern regarding rendering the compulsory li-
censing provisions useless by the threat of retaliatory measures
from the developed countries and their powerful pharmaceuti-
cal industries, was one of the many reasons that spurred the
TRIPS Council to meet on June 20, 2001. Participants, includ-
ing the United States, Europe, and Japan, agreed at the TRIPS
Council meeting on June 20, 2001, that the HIV/AIDS epidemic
is clearly an emergency in Africa and other countries warranting
the invocation of Articles 30 and 31. 4 ' That was not enough,
however, and it was still necessary for the Members to meet again
in Doha, Qatar on November 14, 2001 to declare, among other
statements, that the developing and the least developed coun-
tries should feel free to use compulsory licensing to deal with
medical urgencies and cases of emergency as long as TRIPS con-
ditions are satisfied.45
The Doha meeting also acknowledged the limitations of the
compulsory licensing system in meeting public health emergen-
cies in cases where a country lacks the necessary technological
43. It is worth noting here the different roles of the judiciary in the common law
(Australia, Britain, Canada, India, United States, etc.) and civil law systems. While the
former restricts the role of the judge to the facts presented by both parties with an
adversarial perspective, the latter gives the judge more leeway in considering other
facts. The role of the judge in most civil law systems is inquisitorial where the judge
may direct the parties to present more evidence or submissions on a certain point.
44. See Doha Declaration, supra n.13.
45. Id.
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expertise and resources to manufacture the required
pharmaceuticals. Compulsory licensing seems to be a powerful
weapon in the hands of those countries that have a strong infra-
structure where the licensed pharmaceutical can be manufac-
tured to respond to public health needs. After the September
1 1th terrorist attack on the United States and the anthrax scare,
the United States used the threat of compulsory licensing as a
powerful weapon in negotiating the reduction of prices and pro-
duction of mass quantities with the holder of the patent on An-
thrax vaccines - Bayer. The same weapon is not as effective in
the hands of many developing countries.
In addition, Members acknowledged that providing patent
protection for pharmaceuticals in the developing countries
would not encourage R&D expenditure for cures of local dis-
eases (e.g., malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS), given the low ex-
pected financial returns. This has been characterized by a num-
ber of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") (e.g., Oxfam),
as the "fundamental imbalance in TRIPS."4 6 Although the Doha
Declaration did not come with solutions to remedy this identi-
fied imbalance, it charged the TRIPS Council with finding expe-
ditious solutions, and with reporting back to the General Coun-
cil by the end of 2002. Despite the fact that the Doha Declara-
tion did not provide "satisfactory" answers to TRIPS
"imbalances," it did help in easing the anxieties of the develop-
ing countries, once the developed countries promised to behave.
That being said, it is noted that the TRIPS Agreement did envis-
age the "imbalance" problem and therefore ensured in Article
67 for the provision of aid by the developed countries. Article 67
states that the developed countries "shall provide, on request
and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and fi-
nancial cooperation in favor of developing and least developed
countries Members. '47 Article 67 has not been given much ef-
fect, as many promises by the developed countries to provide aid
remain unfulfilled.48
Amidst these uncertainties regarding the effect of TRIPS on
the developing countries, and in that convoluted global environ-
46. See Oxfam Policy Papers, TRIPS and Public Health: the Next Battle (2002) [herein-
after TRIPS and Public Health], available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk.
47. TRIPS, art. 67.
48. See TRIPS and Public Health, supra n.46.
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ment, most developing countries enacted laws to comply with
TRIPS. In such compliance, the Arab Republic of Egypt49 passed
the Intellectual Property Code in June 2000, and opted to adopt
the transitional period so that patents are available for the pro-
tection of pharmaceutical products by the end of 2005. Mean-
while, Egypt was required to provide for mailbox applications
and EMRs by January 2000. That did happen, but only many
months later.
III. EGYPTIAN LAW RELATING TO PHARMACEUTICALS IN
COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS PROVISIONS
A. Protection of Pharmaceuticals Prior to TRIPS
The old Egyptian Patent Law No. 132, as amended, was en-
acted in 1949.") The old law excluded pharmaceutical products
from patent protection but extended such protection to the pro-
cess - "the method of production." Prior art only extended to
the past fifty years. In comparison with the U.S. patent law, the
old Egyptian law provided for clear rights to the employer where
the subject matter of the invention was within the business, and
entitled employers to acquire patents, provided that the inventor
was compensated fairly. Patents extended over a term of fifteen
years, and the patentee could apply for a five-year extension
upon proving that the invention was not adequately exploited."
Under the old law, patents had to be used within three years
of the date of issue within Egypt, after which date the Egyptian
Patent Office ("EPO") could impose a compulsory license over
the patent. It was possible to impose compulsory licenses over
patents in cases where the patent was worked but where its ex-
ploitation was insufficient for a country's needs, or if the paten-
tee discontinued the exploitation of the invention for two con-
secutive years. The compulsory license in this case was offered a
party that was unreasonably refused a license by the patentee;
where the patentee requested unreasonable compensation; or
where the patentee denied a license to a third party owning a
49. Egypt has an area of around one million square kilometers with twenty-six
Governorates. It has a population of 69,523,644 as of July 2001 with a growth rate of
1.69% as of the year 2001. The national Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") growth rate,
as of the year 2000, is 5%.
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related patent precluding the latter from the practice of its eco-
nomically significant invention. All these decisions were subject
to review by the administrative court.5 2
As is evident from the foregoing brief outline, the old law
contained the main principles for patent protection of all inven-
tions including chemical processes, but excluded pharmaceuti-
cal products. Egypt signed TRIPS in 1995, with an effective date
of 2000. That, however, did not silence the debate as to the dis-
advantages of extending patent protection to pharmaceuticals
inside Egypt and in many other developing countries. Although
Egypt was very well aware of its commitment to comply with
TRIPS, the transition period for providing pharmaceuticals with
patent protection required more time for Egypt to decide for
itself how it would strike a balance between the conflicting issues
of creating attractive market conditions while, at the same time,
preserving the local industry and dealing with the access prob-
lem. This contributed considerably to delays in passing the new
TRIPS-compliant law.
B. Egypt and TRIPS - to TRIP or not to TRIP
On the global level, Egypt shared with other developing
countries anxieties regarding its ability to effectively invoke the
exceptions to patentability stipulated in TRIPS without being
subjected to retaliatory trade measures from the developed
countries. These anxieties were eased through assurances from
the developed countries in a number of meetings throughout
2001 and 2002 that the developed countries would not abuse
their power or at least would be more considerate of the serious
problems of poverty and inadequate access to essential
medicines. It was not until the Doha Declaration of November
14, 2002 that the developing countries were assured they would
not be subjected to unilateral retaliatory measures if they in-
voked Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS.5 3 Another major concern
was that the invocation of these provisions did not in any way
guarantee that the developing countries could solve problems of
access to medicines without the serious commitment and collab-
oration of the developed countries and multinational pharma-
ceutical giants.
52. Id.
53. See Doha Declaration, supra n.13.
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On the domestic level, the scene was not much different.
Similar issues and debates persisted in relation to how TRIPS
would be implemented under Egyptian law and as to the scope
of patenting exceptions to be incorporated. The first debate
that ensued in the Egyptian Parliament beginning in 1999, was
whether Egypt should take an additional grace period until 2005
to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals, particularly
given the fact that it was already committed to providing other
rights throughout the transitional period (e.g. EMRs). A num-
ber of interest groups on both sides of the debate lobbied the
Egyptian Parliament, and the intense unresolved debates consid-
erably contributed to more delays in passing a TRIPS-compliant
law by January 2000.
On the one side, the mainly multinational, research-based
pharmaceutical companies lobbied for compliance in 2000.
Both the Minister of Health and the EPO supported that posi-
tion. The Minister of Health, Dr. Ismail Sallam, argued for the
legislation based on the government's economic reforms and
the need to move to a free and open market. In addressing the
fear of high increases in pharmaceuticals' prices, Dr. Sallam re-
flected on the good will between the Ministry of Health and the
multinationals in negotiating prices and collaborating to main-
tain adequate access to essential medicines. The problem of
price increase54 was seen as one based on a multitude of factors,
not limited to the introduction of patent protection. The EPO
also supported compliance by the year 2000 mainly because the
mailbox application system would cause backlogs in the office
that the EPO would rather avoid. The EPO also explained that
the fact that those applications, subject to certain conditions,
would be entitled to EMRs, defeated the motivation for the de-
lay. It was argued that it would be better to decide on the appli-
cations as soon as possible, instead of having EMRs for products
that may not satisfy the Egyptian patentability requirements.
Despite the well-articulated positions of the Minister of
Health and the EPO, the local pharmaceutical producers lob-
bied for invoking an additional five-year grace period. Dr. Galal
Ghorab, the Chairman of the Holding Company for
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals ("HCPC"), led the campaign
54. See infra. W.A. Price Control, Differential Pricing and Parallel Imports.
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against compliance with TRIPS by January 2000"5 and repre-
sented a number of local pharmaceutical companies. Dr.
Ghorab and other representatives of the local "reformulation"
companies vehemently argued that Egypt should wait until 2005
for compliance, mainly to give the local producers more time to
build their research capabilities, which had been limited to re-
formulation and reverse engineering of pharmaceuticals. Fur-
thermore, there were allegations that the Egyptian government,
represented by the practices of the Ministry of Health, discrimi-
nated against the local industries and particularly the companies
with substantive public holdings, by forcing them to price prod-
ucts at a loss, and by not paying back outstanding debts (supply
to public hospitals and clinics), which amounted to over EE 350
million.56 These factors, Dr. Ghorab argued, undermined the
local companies' ability to compete effectively and hence,
should be addressed in the transitional period.
The debate was resolved by invoking the additional transi-
tional period of the year 2005. According to TRIPS, however,
Egypt still had to comply with the mailbox, EMRs, and undis-
closed information provisions by January 2000. The debates on
the global level concerned compulsory licensing and access of
the poor masses, and those on the domestic level concerned the
economic and healthcare infrastructures. Drafts went back and
forth in the Parliament until the law was eventually passed in
June 2002.
C. The New Law - the Intellectual Property Code No. 82 of 2002
To comply with TRIPS, the Egyptian patent law had to
change to accommodate for pharmaceutical patents; mailbox
applications; EMRs; protection of undisclosed information, in-
cluding that related to pharmaceuticals; and to regulate compul-
sory licensing in compliance with Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS.
55. Originally, the HCPC was a holding company of public pharmaceutical compa-
nies. Later, in conformity with Egypt's policy on privatization, many of the affiliated
companies were privatized, where public holdings were considerably reduced. The
HCPC holds eleven companies, seven of which are producers of pharmaceuticals. The
other companies include packaging material, medical appliances, and baby milk pro-
ducers.
56. See Adam Morrow, Egyptian Health Ministry Sticks to Old Exchange Rate, MIDDLE
EASi NEws ONLINE (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.middleeastwire.com.
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1. Patent and Other Protection for Pharmaceuticals
Section 2 of the Presidential Decree promulgating the new
law provides that pharmaceutical products will be excluded from
patent protection until January 2005, without prejudice to Arti-
cles 44 and 45 of the law pertaining to mailbox applications and
EMRs.7
According to Article 1, to be patentable, an invention
should be novel, contain a creative (innovative) step, and be in-
dustrially applicable.5 8 Patent protection does not extend to any
of the following according to Article 2:
1. Discoveries and scientific theories, mathematical formulae,
computer programs, and diagrams.
2. Diagnostic and surgical methods for humans and animals.
3. Plant and animal varieties, regardless of their uniqueness,
if derived through biological (sexual) means, except mi-
croorganisms, and plants and animals derived by non-bio-
logical (asexual) means.
4. Live organs, tissues, and cells; natural biological matter,
amino acids and the genome. 59
Article 13 adds more exceptions to cover the patenting of
folk remedies and indigenous culture. It stipulates that the in-
ventor should show that s/he has obtained the invention using
legitimate means, which probably refers to compensation of the
original owners.6" Along with many other provisions of the new
law, this Article will be further clarified in the Executive Regula-
tions, which are yet to be passed.
Article 10 goes further to define non-infringing uses as follows:
1. Scientific research.
2. The making of a product, or the use of a method, by a
party in Egypt who has, in good faith, used the method or
the product prior to the date of the patent application re-
lating to the same patented invention. The party entitled
to use the invention can only use it in its own interest and
cannot assign these operations, except as part of the whole
business.
3. Indirect uses of the method of production, which form the
57. Author's trans. Presidential decree is available at http://www.agip.com/laws/
egypt/p.htm.
58. See Law No. 82, art. 1 (author's trans.).
59. See id. art. 2 (author's trans.).
60. See id. art. 13 (author's trans.).
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patented invention, to produce other products not cov-
ered by the patent.
4. The use of the invention in land, air, or maritime transpor-
tation by one of the WTO Members, or those that afford
Egypt reciprocal treatment, whenever their vehicles are in
Egypt on a temporary or casual basis.
5. The making, use, composition, or sale of the product by
another within the patent term for the sole purpose of ob-
taining marketing rights thereon, provided the product is
not marketed until the expiry of the patent.
6. Any other acts performed by others provided that they do
not unreasonably interfere with the normal use of the pat-
ent, or unreasonably hinder the legitimate interests of the
patentee, and provided that the legitimate interests of
others are not jeopardized.6 '
It is not clear what uses Article 10(6) permits. The more
important Article, however, is Article 10(5),62 which is aimed at
striking a balance between the interests of the generic and the
research-based pharmaceutical companies, known as the regula-
tory exception, or "boiler" provision. Such provisions allow the
generic producers to use the patented invention for the purpose
of developing a bio-equivalent copy to be marketed immediately
after the patent expires. It should be read in conjunction with
the provisions protecting the test data presented in connection
with marketing approvals, and which is protected as "undis-
closed information."
Articles 55 and 56 provide for the protection of undisclosed
information in general and the information submitted to seek
marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals. The "competent au-
thorities" - the Ministry of Health for pharmaceuticals - shall
protect the undisclosed information from being divulged, or
from being subject to unfair competitive use for five years from
the date this information is provided, or until it is no longer a
secret, whichever is shorter.6 3 In that respect, Egypt follows the
61. See id. art. 10 (author's trans.).
62. See World Trade Organization, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS/114R, at Secs. 7.88-7.93 (Mar. 17, 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.wto.org. Article 10(5) mirrors the corresponding Canadian provi-
sion, which was upheld in a case by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The Canadian
provision is different from similar provisions in the United States, for example, in that it
allows the sale of the patented product as well as its use.
63. See Law No. 82, art. 55-56 (author's trans.).
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example of many European countries that limit protection of
such information for periods ranging from five to ten years. It
seems that this point has not been thoroughly debated. The
main concern for research-based pharmaceutical companies
when it comes to protection of such information (test results,
clinical and other studies to show the safety and efficacy of the
pharmaceutical in question for obtaining market approval) is
that such information is not relied upon either by the Ministry of
Health or the generic producer to obtain approval for generic
products, and hence free ride on the test data, which costs tens
of millions.
The unauthorized use of test data is a serious problem in
Egypt for research-based companies. In late 2001, a group of
research-based companies complained to the Ministry of Health
after noticing a chain of approvals granted to generic producers
in a short time, strongly implying that they did not generate
their own test data.6 4 Now, with the passage of Articles 55 and
56, the Ministry of Health is obliged to ensure that there is no
access to the test data except for the purposes of examining the
application of the originator of the information. Article 57 goes
even further by providing that the liability of the Ministry of
Health is not exonerated when that information is used by an-
other party without authorization, unless the Ministry of Health
proves that it took all reasonable and sufficient measures to pro-
tect it. 6 5 Article 57 goes steps further than required by TRIPS to
instill trust in the regulatory bodies and to send a strong message
that test data will be used only in the interest of the originator.66
It is not clear whether the Ministry of Health is entitled, after the
expiry of the five-year protection period, to consider the test
data in approving subsequent applications by generic producers.
It is submitted that such an allowance is desirable as it boosts the
local generic production of pharmaceuticals. The experience of
the United States in that regard can be used as a guide.
The U.S. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act, known as the Hatch Waxman Act, allows research-based
companies to apply to "restore" the term of their patents, consid-
64. See Niveen Wahish, At Loggerheads over Patent Rights, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE,
(May 24-30, 2001), available at www.ahram.org.
65. See Law No. 82, art. 57 (author's trans.).
66. Id.
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erably shortened by the long testing and registration process, in
return for allowing the generic producers to refer to the test
data submitted by the former to the Federal Drug Administra-
tion for marketing approval.6 7 The research-based companies
can apply for up to five years to restore the term of their patents,
provided that the "effective life" of the patent does not exceed
fourteen years. This allows the research-based companies to
recoup more of their investment costs in cases where the testing
and drug registration processes take very long, adversely affect-
ing the exploitation period. On the other hand, the generic
producers can avoid spending millions to prove that the generic
product is safe and effective by referring to the test data previ-
ously presented by the research-based companies. Generic pro-
ducers only have to show that the generic product is bio-
equivalent to the branded pharmaceutical, and save tens of mil-
lions in the process.
The Hatch Waxman Act was very successful in striking the
desired balance with positive results for both, the generic and
the research-based companies. It is reported that since 1983, the
generic producers' market share grew from 19% to 50% to date,
valued at U.S.$10 billion in 1999 and expected to double by
2010. The Act also enabled price reductions at an earlier time.
While under the old system it took two to five years after the
expiry of the patent for a generic to be introduced into the mar-
ket, now the generic gets introduced immediately and sells for
around 25% of the price of the branded pharmaceutical. In ad-
dition, it is claimed that the ability to "restore" patent terms has
encouraged research-based companies to increase their R&D ex-
penditures, which rose to U.S.$26 billion in 2000 compared to
U.S.$3.6 billion in 1984."8
2. Mailbox and EMRs
Although the new law does not provide patent protection
for pharmaceuticals until 2005, it provides for acceptance of pat-
ent applications in a "mailbox" as of January 1995. Article 43
provides that the EPO shall accept patent applications starting
from January 1, 1995, relating to chemical and agricultural food,
67. Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title 11 (1984).
68. See Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturing Association ("PhRMA"), Hatch-
Waxman: the Rsults are in, available at http://inovation.phrma.org.
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and chemical pharmaceutical products, and shall keep it until
January 1, 2005, at which time they would be due for examina-
tion.69 The Article provides further that once a patent is issued,
protection starts from the date of issue for twenty years as
though from the date of filing an application.70
Article 44 provides that the applicant may apply for EMRs
provided that:
" An application has been lodged afterJanuary 1, 1995;
" A patent covering the same invention has been granted in a
Member pursuant to an application submitted afterJanuary
1, 1995;
* The applicant has obtained marketing approval in that
Member for the same product; and
" The applicant has obtained marketing approval from the
competent authority in Egypt.71
The Article further stipulates that the EPO shall grant an
EMR certificate after the approval of a Ministerial Committee to
be formed by the Prime Minister.72 So far, the new law complies
with TRIPS in that it provides for mailbox and EMRs. However,
with vague terms as to who will receive and decide on EMR appli-
cations, more delays are on the horizon until the executive regu-
lations are issued and the Ministerial Committee is actually
formed.
Article 44 also adds another qualification, providing that if
the application was published one year from the date of being
lodged with the EPO, it cannot be subject to an EMR applica-
tion.73 It is not clear what is intended by this qualification or
what is meant by "publication." TRIPS and the new law condi-
tion the grant of EMRs on applying and obtaining a patent as
well as marketing approval in another Member after January 1,
1995. The question remains - would having a patent issued
and published in 1996, for example, defeat the right to an EMR
if an application was actually lodged in the mailbox in 1997?
Again, it is not clear what would happen in such a case.
EMRs, in compliance with TRIPS and the new law, extend
over five years or until a patent application is decided, whichever
69. See Law No. 82, art. 43 (author's trans.).
70. Id.
71. See id. art. 44 (author's trans.).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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is shorter. The above-mentioned Ministerial Committee may, in
certain cases, revoke the EMR where the right holder abuses the
right. Although it is not mentioned on what basis such an abuse
will be reviewed, the decision of the Ministerial Committee is
reviewable by the Administrative Court, according to the general
rules of the Egyptian Administrative Law.
3. Exceptions to Patent Rights and Compulsory Licensing
The new law bases its governing use and compulsory licens-
ing provisions on Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS, and clearly identi-
fies circumstances under which they can be invoked. Article 17
of the new law is based on Articles 8, 27(2), and 30 of TRIPS,
which allow Members to adopt measures to protect public health
and interest as well as the environment. Article 17 of the new
law provides:
The EPO shall send to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry
of Military Production, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the
Ministry of Health as the case may be, copies of patent appli-
cations which pertain to defense, military production, public
security, or have value to military, security or health concerns
[. . .].74
Article 17 entitles the Minister of any of the mentioned min-
istries "to oppose the approval of the patent application within
ninety days of receipt." In such circumstances, the issuance of
the patent is halted. The procedures are not specified and it is
not clear whether the patent applicant may apply for judicial re-
view of this decision.75
The wide scope of Article 17 may be alarming, particularly
as it is a new addition when compared to the old law. The old
law did provide for revocation of patent rights on the grounds of
national security and public interest. Article 25 of the new law
provides the same and adds the ground of public health as well.
It provides that in cases where compulsory licensing is insuffi-
cient, the patent may be revoked. The patentee is to be compen-
sated for the fair commercial value of the invention and may
appeal the decision of confiscation as well as the amount of com-
pensation within sixty days.7 6
74. See id. art. 17 (author's trans.).
75. Id.
76. See id. art. 25 (author's trans.).
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It seems that Articles 17 and 25 address similar situations to
halt the issuance of a patent or revoke it after it is granted. With
these Articles, Egypt is arming itself with all the provisions neces-
sary to respond to pressing public needs.
More exceptions are provided in Article 23, which outlines
the conditions and the procedures for compulsory licensing.
77
The provisions stipulated under Article 31 of TRIPS are reiter-
ated here. In addition, Article 23 stipulates other situations
where compulsory licensing may be invoked. Article 23(1)-(3)
provides that a compulsory license may be imposed "to support
national efforts for the economic, social and technological devel-
opment of vital sectors, without prejudice to the rights of the
patentee. '7' Although compulsory licensing is not covered
under TRIPS Article 31, it is alluded to in Article 8, which allows
Members to adopt measures designed "to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic
and technological development.
79
Article 23(1)-(3) is designed to address the issue of develop-
ing the local pharmaceutical industry to deal better with the
problem of access to necessary medicines."° That being said, this
Article may be challenged given the developed countries' insis-
tence that no exceptions should be made, regardless of the
TRIPS Articles, except in the most extreme situations. Using the
TRIPS compulsory licensing for development, other than for
strict healthcare purposes, was discussed in the TRIPS Council
meeting of June 20, 2001, where both, the United States and
Switzerland opposed the developing countries' contention that
TRIPS exceptions can be used to develop local pharmaceutical
production. The United States and Switzerland argued that any
such action falls outside of the TRIPS provisions as it relates to
industrial rather than health policies.8 ' This point needs to be
further clarified by the TRIPS General Council in light of Article
8.
Article 23(2) expressly provides for compulsory licensing of
77. See id. art. 23 (author's trans.).
78. Id.
79. TRIPS, art. 8.
80. See Law No. 82, art. 23(1.)-(2) (author's trans.).
81. See World Health Organization and World Trade Organization Secretariats,
Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs: Executive Summary of Re-
port (Apr. 8-11, 2001), available at http://www.who.int.
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pharmaceuticals in a way that mirrors the French Intellectual
Property Code provisions.12 It provides that the Minister of
Health may impose a compulsory license over a patented phar-
maceutical whenever the supply does not satisfy local need, or
the pharmaceutical is of unacceptable quality, or offered at un-
reasonable prices. This provision seems to fall within the ambit
of TRIPS Article 31, although unlike Article 31, it foregoes the
condition that there be a case of urgent emergency. The fact
that it is a provision incorporated into the laws of some devel-
oped countries makes it interesting to see how it will be accepted
by the other developed countries.
Furthermore, Article 23(4) repeats the condition of "work-
ing the patent" stipulated in the old law, but extends the period
to four years from the date of the application or three years from
the date of issue, whichever is longer.8 3 This does not seem to
make much difference except in cases where the patent issues in
less than a year, a possibility that seems too remote, particularly
for applications covering pharmaceuticals. This rule, however, is
not to be applied strictly, as the Article further provides that the
EPO should extend this period if the delay in exploitation is
caused by technical, legal, or economic reasons beyond the con-
trol of the patentee.
The new law has more teeth because its deterrent effect ex-
ceeds that of the old law. The old law's penalties for patent in-
fringement included two years of imprisonment, and statutory
damages ranging from £E 10 to LE 300 for each incident, which
is of no deterrent effect. The new law reinstates the same term
of imprisonment but only in cases of repeated infringement.
Most importantly, it raises the statutory damages from 100% to
300% in the order of E 20,000 to £E 100,000 for each infringe-
ment, which are doubled in cases of repeated infringement. Al-
though it is arguable that the amount of statutory damages is still
not deterrent in cases of pharmaceuticals, it is a leap from the
damages that could be awarded under the old law. In addition
to that, the Court has the discretion to issue injunctive orders,
and is required to order confiscation of the infringing products.
82. See Law No. 82, art. 23(2) (author's trans.). See also France Intellectual Prop-
erty Code, art. L. 613-16 (providing for compulsory licensing of patents issued on drugs
whenever patented drugs are supplied in insufficient quantity, are of poor quality, or
offered at abnormally high prices).
83. See id. art. 23(4) (author's trans.).
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Overall, the new law complies with TRIPS provisions and in
some cases expands on them. Until complete patent protection
is given to pharmaceuticals in 2005, market exclusivity is guaran-
teed for the pharmaceuticals that satisfy the specified require-
ments. The process of obtaining market exclusivity, however, is
still not clear and more delays will be involved until the execu-
tive regulations are passed and the Ministerial Committee en-
trusted with the process is formed. Meanwhile pharmaceutical
companies are assured the protection of their test data under
the undisclosed information provision, which is of extreme im-
portance for research-based pharmaceutical companies in Egypt.
Having good laws, however, is only the first step, as the ability to
take effective enforcement action is of critical importance. In
that regard, the collaboration of the regulatory bodies as well as
the judiciary to apply the new law and to effectively enable en-
forcement, is essential. The law cannot be applied in a vacuum
and the pharmaceutical industry is certainly affected by more
than intellectual property laws. There are other legal and eco-
nomic considerations that have significantly shaped and still
shape the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry, as outlined below.
IV. THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY -
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
The pharmaceutical industry in general is divided into two
main groups: the research-based (or innovator) companies and
the generic producers. The first group is extremely dependant
on patent protection due to the enormous R&D costs involved
(around U.S.$800 million) to produce a breakthrough (one out
of 5,000 compounds), and the extended period of ten to twelve
years that it takes to introduce it into the market.84 Patent pro-
tection allows the company to charge high prices and hence,
recoup its investment. Global expenditures on pharmaceutical
R&D reached an estimated U.S.$40 billion in 2000, where over
50% was expended by U.S. companies. The top ten companies
are reported to spend between U.S.$1.5 to U.S.$2.5 billion a year
on R&D. The U.S. (research-based) pharmaceutical industry is
very profitable, with profits reaching nearly four times the me-
dian rate for all Fortune 500 companies.85 Some reports indi-
84. See Nair, supra n.6.
85. Id.
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cate that pharmaceuticals, to which no generic yet exists, cost
around U.S.$25 and are sold for around U.S.$300. The leading
pharmaceutical companies report gross profits between 70%-
80% as prices rise faster than the inflation rate.86 Forty percent
of all sales of the U.S. pharmaceutical companies come from
overseas and they supply nearly 50% of major pharmaceuticals
sold worldwide, with a growth rate of 3%-5% annually.
8 7
The U.S. generic pharmaceutical industry is also of consid-
erable size, with 320 companies manufacturing generic drugs
some being owned by, or in a joint venture with, the research-
based companies. The generic industry has a growth rate of
2.5% over five years.88 It is estimated that as of the year 2000,
300 best-selling brand name drugs were available in generic
form. Prices usually drop from 40% to 65% after the generic
version is introduced into the market.89 The generic producers
play an integral part in reducing the price of pharmaceuticals,
and hence, in increasing the level of access to essential
medicines.
There is no basis for comparison between the U.S. and the
Egyptian pharmaceutical industries. Still, the Egyptian pharma-
ceutical industry is very attractive to the U.S. and other foreign
pharmaceutical companies, given its size and growth potential.
The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry is the largest producer
and consumer of pharmaceuticals in the MENA region, where it
provides 30% of the supply." U.S. pharmaceutical companies
hold around 18% of the market share in the Egyptian pharma-
ceutical industry, which was estimated at U.S.$1.28 billion in
1999 with a growth rate of 14% annually.9 ' The U.S. companies'
market share is expected to grow to 25% where the U.S. Pharma-
ceutical Research Manufacturing Association ("PhRLA") esti-
mates over U.S.$300 million will be invested by PhRMA mem-
bers in the few coming years.
The local pharmaceutical production is based on drug re-
86. Id.




90. See Cairo American Chamber of Commerce ("AmCham"), The Egyptian Pharma-
ceutical Industry (Feb. 2002), available at www.amcham.org.
91. See Corporate Information, Pharmaceuticals and Corporate Information, available
at http://www.corporateinformation.com.
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formulation rather than R&D where 92.5% of pharmaceuticals
are produced locally and 7.5% imported in the finished form.
Nearly 85% of the raw materials used in the production are im-
ported.9 2 This limits the ability of the Egyptian market to stabi-
lize prices. Added to that are a number of economic, social, and
regulatory factors that affect competition in the Egyptian phar-
maceutical industry. The most important relate to price control,
parallel imports, and the economic policies that will be em-
ployed to develop the healthcare infrastructure. To that we now
turn.
A. Price Control, Differential Pricing and Parallel Imports
Price increases beyond the purchasing ability of the poor
masses constitute one of the major concerns stemming from the
extension of patent protection to pharmaceuticals in all develop-
ing countries. There are an estimated 1.2 billion people world-
wide surviving on less than one-dollar-a-day, and 2.8 billion on
less than two dollars a day, 90% of whom live in South or East
Asia and Africa. 3 When it comes to Egypt, around 20.15% of its
approximate population of 70 million people is below the lower
poverty line, and 49.6% below the upper poverty line.94 The
highest poverty incidence is reported in the Upper Egypt urban
region, amounting to 36%, where the poor masses' access to
healthcare facilities is not the problem - its cost is. In Egypt,
between 14 and 35 million people will be hit hard with any in-
creases in the prices of pharmaceuticals, particularly those re-
lated to diabetes, renal and heart diseases, and cancer. These
statistics make maintaining the prices within affordable limits es-
sential. The goal can be achieved only if the real reasons behind
the increase of prices are understood.
Determining the causes behind price increases and hence,
the intensification of the access problem, is essential for identify-
ing solutions, and the formulation of appropriate economic poli-
92. Id.
93. See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ("CIPR"), Integrating Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Policy, at 8 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.iprcom-
mission.org.
94. See Heba El-Leithy, Gender Dimensions of Poverty in Egypt, Forum Newsletter,
ECON. RES. F. FOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES, IRAN & TURKEY, Vol. 8, No.2 (Oct. 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.erf.org.eg/nletter/oct01_9.asp (citing statistics based on 1999/2000
household income and expenditure survey by CAPMAS).
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cies to regulate the pharmaceutical industry and the market as a
whole. A lot of discussion has ensued as to whether patent pro-
tection is the prime cause behind the price increases of
pharmaceuticals, with reports and studies in support of both
sides. NERA Economic Consulting studied pharmaceutical
prices in nine developing countries over eleven years. In 1998, it
concluded that patent protection did not significantly impact
pricing but instead, pricing was a result of market-based factors
e.g., competition from other pharmaceuticals. This seems to be
true in countries where the healthcare and economic infrastruc-
tures are developed to an extent that local and generic produc-
ers can effectively compete, causing prices to drop, a prerequi-
site that is lacking in Egypt to a considerable extent. In addition,
as other studies indicate, the prices of many essential
pharmaceuticals did increase following the introduction of pat-
ent protection. Abdul-Aziz Saleh of the WHO, cites a number of
studies reporting that prices of pharmaceuticals have increased
from 5% to 76.7% in the developing countries. 5 Furthermore,
Dr. J. Quick, WHO Director of Essential Drugs and Medicines
Policy, adds that when a patent expires, the price of the branded
pharmaceutical drops by 40% when there is one generic compet-
itor, and by 71% when there are ten generic competitors. He
adds that with strong generic industries in only a handful of
countries, mainly the developed countries, price increases fol-
lowing patent protection are certain.96
There is no doubt that patent protection is at least one of
the main factors behind the increase of pharmaceutical prices.
The real question, however, is what is the cost to society and the
global community if such protection is lacking. There is ample
evidence that lacking patent protection will significantly dry up
R&D expenditures and hence, may be even more costly as dis-
eases get out of control. One of the best analyses of the reasons
behind price increases is that presented by Dr. Bale of IFPMA,
showing that the cost to society of lack of protection may be
95. See Abdul Aziz Saleh, Impact of Globalization on Drug Industry: Possible Risks and
Means to Overcome Them, THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON "THE IMPACr OF
GLOBALIZATION ON DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH CARE SERVICE IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES"
(March 23-27, 2002), available at http://www.islamset.com.
96. See Jonathan Quick, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing Coun-
tries and Least Developed Countries - Framework for Action, IOMS CONFERENCE, available at
http://www.islamset.com.
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much higher. Dr. Bale explains that the cost of no protection is
infinite, which, while high during patent protection, will decline
in the long run. This decline may take place before the expira-
tion of the patent term, upon introduction of other similar
pharmaceuticals into the market.
In Egypt, prices of pharmaceuticals are certainly affected by
many other factors in addition to patent protection. First, the
fact that 85% of the raw materials that go into the local produc-
tion of pharmaceuticals are imported, increases prices dramati-
cally.97 This was accentuated in the previous two years with the
devaluation of the Egyptian pound from LE 3.84 per U.S.$1.00
in 2001 to £E4.58 per U.S.$1.00 as of the date of this Article.
Since the start of 2002, the prices of many essential pharmaceuti-
cals have skyrocketed. An example is Intergel, an anti-adhesive
substance whose price experienced a 70% increase within four
months.98 The Egyptian government reacted by forcing local
producers (private/public companies) to set their prices at the
old conversion rate, affecting their ability to compete with the
multinationals. In fact, this stirred accusations from HCPC and
other companies that they were discriminated against by the gov-
ernment. Dr. Ahmed Al-Minawi of the Egyptian Medical Maga-
zine explained that the government had to take such action to
prevent public hospitals and clinics from going bankrupt.99
The roots of the problem of pharmaceutical price increases
in Egypt go even deeper. They are based in the inability of the
local producers to effectively compete with the multinationals
due to the weak economic and healthcare infrastructure. Dr.
Sarwat Basily, President of the Ministry of Health Chamber of
Pharmaceutical Industries, explained that despite the best ef-
forts of the Egyptian government to move to a free market, "mar-
ket forces cannot be applied - as they are in the U.S. - to the
pharmaceutical industry."'00 Despite this, Egypt is resisting an
utterly paternalistic approach to the local pharmaceutical indus-
97. See Dr. Harvey Bale, Jr., TI UPS, Pharmaceuticals and Developing Countries: Implica-
tions for Drug Access and Drug Development, WHO WORKSHOP ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND rrs IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICALS, Jakarta, Indonesia (May 2, 2000), available at
http://www.ifpma.org (citing study showing that prices of equivalent drugs in Mexico
and Taiwan with patent protection were less than prices offered in Egypt even though
no patent protection was available then).
98. See Wahish, supra n.64.
99. Id.
100. Id.
310 FORDHAMIN TERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:274
try, as well as the use of stringent price controls. Instead, the
Minister of Health has presented, as the ideal solution, setting
some price controls through negotiation with the various phar-
maceutical companies.
The following are other solutions, some of which have al-
ready taken effect.
B. Differential Pricing
Differential pricing is where the same pharmaceutical is
sold for less in the developing country, taking into account the
purchasing ability of the poor masses. Many multinationals have
expressed preference for this method as opposed to price con-
trols, provided parallel imports are restricted."' So far, this
seems to be the best option, as it fosters good will between the
government and the pharmaceutical companies, particularly the
multinationals, as long as there is no discrimination against the
local companies affecting their competitive ability. It has to be
noted, however, that deferential pricing may be controversial
with the rising international scrutiny of prices. Also, with grow-
ing access problems in the developed countries, 1 2 differential
pricing may be politically harmful. The WHO and WTO Secre-
tariats asserted in their meeting in Norway on April 8-11,
2001,1"3 that whenever differential pricing is used, it is important
to clarify that lower prices for the developing countries do not
mean higher prices for the developed countries. The Meeting
also touched upon concerns relating to creating an anti-dump-
ing effect on the local industries of the developing countries.
C. Parallel Imports of Cheaper Pharmaceuticals
Parallel imports are products made and marketed by a pat-
ent owner in more than one country, which are later imported
into one of these countries without the authorization of the pat-
ent owner. This is based on the legal principle of "exhaustion of
rights," which provides that once a patent owner sells its product
101. See Fouad Benghalem, Financing and Differential Pricing of the Essential Medicines
for Developed and Least Developed Countries, IOMS CONFERENCF, available at http://www.
islamset.com.
102. An example is the United States where the elderly's access to medicines is
increasingly diminishing, thereby raising public health concerns.
103. See World Trade Organization, WO, WHO secretariats workshop on affordable
drugs, available at http://www.wto.org for a list of final reports and discussions.
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in one country, its patent is exhausted and it has no more rights
or control over the product. Article 6 of TRIPS clearly excludes
from its dispute settlement power such disputes relating to provi-
sions in domestic laws of Members that allow parallel imports.1 0 4
The significance of this for pharmaceuticals comes up in situa-
tions where the same product is sold at considerably different
prices in two countries, the product is imported into one of the
countries by a third party and offered for sale at a reduced price,
thereby affecting the patent owner's ability to maintain the
higher price in the second country. It is not clear if Egypt would
use this method to provide affordable pharmaceuticals, but it is
certainly a solution that may be used, given that it is permitted
under the new law.
D. Monetary Fund To Stabilize Prices
Both, the WHO/WTO Meeting and the Commission on In-
tellectual Property Rights ("CIPR"), formed by Clare Short, the
British Secretary of State for International Development,' ad-
dressed the option of providing developing countries with finan-
cial aid, or the creation of a global fund, to deal with the prob-
lem of access. CIPR argues that providing adequate access to
essential pharmaceuticals should be part of the commitment of
the international community to reduce the proportion of people
in poverty by half in the year 2015. There has been no global
fund established for that purpose to date.
The WHO, however, has prepared a list of 100 essential
medicines needed to treat diseases of major populations, and
lobbied governments and NGOs to provide donations and finan-
cial assistance in this respect. From 1998 to 2001, pharmaceuti-
cal companies and NGOs in the United States alone provided
more than U.S.$1.9 billion in financial assistance and donated
medicines. NGOs, e.g., the Donation Program for River Blind-
ness, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and
the Accelerated Access Initiative, have played critical roles in
solving access problems in twenty-three countries."0 6 Despite
these efforts, the WHO stresses that this is hardly a long-term
104. See TRIPS, art. 6.
105. See CIPR, supra n.93, at 8.
106. See Statement delivered by Dr. Harvey Bale, Jr., IFPMA, on behalf of the re-
search-based pharmaceutical industry at the 55th World Health Assembly, Geneva (May
17, 2002), available at http://www.ifpma.org.
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solution to the problem. Doctors Without Borders have also
strongly criticized these programs for "attaching conditions, lim-
iting the scope of donations, and taking too much time to imple-
ment."''1 7 There seems to be a lot of global pressure on the de-
veloped countries to seriously address this problem, which is cur-
rently under consideration by the TRIPS General Council.
The new law does address this problem briefly, providing in
Article 18 that a fund shall be created to adjust the prices of
pharmaceuticals that are not subject to export, with the main
purpose of stabilizing prices.1" 8 The Minister of Health shall
oversee the operation of the Fund while the President shall de-
termine its financial resources. Article 18 provides further that
any financial assistance granted from other governments or or-
ganizations shall go to the Fund. It is not clear what the needs




Pooled procurement entails the coming together of the de-
veloping countries to negotiate reduced prices for essential
pharmaceuticals with pharmaceutical companies. There are a
number of concerns with this solution relating mainly to quality
issues, and the fact that the national populations of countries in
the MENA region are too small to secure desirable prices.'" °
There are also solutions that address the access problem on the
surface without dealing directly with the root causes relating to
infrastructure.
F. Developing Infrastructure and the Competitive Landscape
Poverty is the main manifestation of a weak economic and
healthcare infrastructure. It does not only affect pharmaceutical
prices, but also the ability of the local producers to effectively
compete, and the feasibility of directing R&D expenditures to
finding cures for local diseases. The R&D and the manufactur-
ing deficiencies that Egypt, among other developing countries,
107. See Doctors Without Borders ("DWB"), World AIDS Day Teleconference Transcript
(Nov. 28, 2000), at www.dwb.org/news/wad2OOO-transcript.htm.
108. See Law No. 82, art. 18 (author's trans.).
109. Id.
110. See Nerozzi, supra n.10, at 629.
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suffers from are very prevalent. The developing countries pro-
duce less that one tenth of pharmaceuticals' output while having
over 75% of the world's population." 1 Looking at the bigger
picture, Egypt faces challenging economic times, as its local in-
dustry struggles to compete in the global pharmaceutical indus-
try. In addition to the Trade Law No. 17 of the year 1999, which
encourages technology transfer, '1 2 Egypt adopted a number of
economic policies to promote public/private development
agreements. An example is the agreement between the Egyptian
Government and Siemens, whereby Siemens will invest LE 1 bil-
lion (250 million Euro) for design, construction, and commis-
sioning of a new pharmaceutical plant to be implemented in
phases from 2003 to 2005. Siemens will also provide technology
transfer training and development of Egyptian employees and
will aim at exporting." 3
CONCLUSION
The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry is the largest in the
MENA region, and it is currently undergoing a number of
changes. The main change relates to extending patent protec-
tion to pharmaceuticals pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.
TRIPS provisions, however, include exceptions to patent rights,
which may be invoked by Members in a number of cases. In
implementing the provisions of TRIPS, Egypt tried to strike a
balance between its economic reform policy and the responsibil-
ity to provide its poor masses with adequate access to essential
medicines. Taking these and other considerations into account,
Egypt passed a new law to provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, while at the same time, providing for excep-
tions in cases of emergencies. The most controversial exception
is related to the use of compulsory licensing for the economic
development of the local industry. Although there is great
doubt that this provision will be invoked, the possibility still ex-
ists.
There is a strong possibility that the Egyptian government
111. See Bale, supra n.97, at 10.
112. On file with author.
113. See Siemens, Press Release, Siemens has been awarded a contract to build a pharma-
ceutical and petrochemical factoy in Egypt (Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.
is.siemens.de. See also Siemens, Siemens in Egypt, at http://www.siemens.come.eg.
314 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
will avoid stringent price controls, resort to compulsory licensing
in cases of emergency, and negotiate with multinationals wher-
ever possible for affordable prices. On the global level, Egypt
will probably continue to lobby with other developing countries
for the creation of a global fund addressing the access problem,
while at the same time procuring grants to the local fund estab-
lished under the new law.
What is more interesting and promising is Egypt's opting
not to control prices and instead, creating a fund for their stabi-
lization. In addition, other methods may be used, e.g., directly
negotiating reduced prices with pharmaceutical companies.
Overall, there is much promise in the Egyptian pharmaceutical
industry, although it remains to be seen how and whether Egypt
will use exceptions to patent rights in tackling the formidable
challenges posed by trade globalization.
